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ABSTRACT 
Through exposure to heterogeneous sources of knowledge, actors who broker between 
unconnected contacts are more likely to generate valuable output. We contribute to the theory 
of social capital of brokerage by considering the impact of field maturity. Using longitudinal 
data from the field of strategic management we find that the benefits of network brokerage 
are stronger during the early stages of field development and diminish as the field matures. 
The results of our study call for further research on the interplay between network structures 
and processes of field emergence. 
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Introduction	
 
In network research, a brokerage position is characterized by the absence of ties between 
the contacts of a focal actor. Brokerage represents not only a source of competitive 
advantage for individuals but also a relevant concept for understanding the advancement of 
organizations and fields, especially in knowledge-intensive and creative settings. These 
characteristics provide strong motives for studying brokerage positions. 
Extant research has shown that actors in brokerage positions are more likely than other 
actors to generate relevant and valuable innovations that are rewarded financially, through 
hierarchical promotions, or symbolically through public accolades and citations (Burt 2005 
for an extensive review; Uzzi and Spiro 2005; Zaheer and Soda 2009). Direct ties to 
otherwise disconnected alters provide opportunities to exchange diverse knowledge, spot 
similarities between seemingly unrelated contents, synthesize apparently contradictory or 
irreconcilable points of view, generate new ideas and test their robustness (Burt 2004; 
Mizruchi and Stearns 2001). Further, individuals in brokerage positions have a timing 
advantage. They are not only more likely to be early recipients of information from diverse 
groups but also occupy a privileged position from which they can assess the relevance of 
new information (Burt 1997; Burt 2007). Therefore, in a competitive process in which 
timing is rewarded, a brokerage position may provide a crucial advantage.  
Despite growing evidence about how brokers can deliver and receive recognition for 
performance, the context in which brokers operate remains under-researched. The relevance 
of context is raised by Burt (1997) in his article on the contingent value of the social capital 
of brokerage. Specifically, Burt shows that the return on brokerage accrues primarily to 
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managers who work in highly uncertain settings. Lack of constraining established templates 
leaves brokers free to craft innovative solutions that benefit both themselves and their 
organizations (Burt 2010; Hansen, Podolny and Pfeffer 2001). Extending this point to the 
market level, Podolny (2001) argues that actors with brokerage networks are more likely to 
sort into market segments characterized by high egocentric uncertainty — that is, 
uncertainty about market opportunities and the ways by which the ego can seize those 
opportunities — because this type of context enables them to generate a higher return on 
brokerage.  
Although these studies are critical for advancing our understanding of the relationship 
between brokerage and context, they address the context from a static perspective. 
Specifically, organizations and markets are treated as being in a sort of steady state, and the 
return on brokerage is analyzed by comparing between organizations or markets that have 
clearly defined characteristics. The strategic implication of conducting such an analysis is 
that actors are better off when they sort into markets and organizations that match their 
strength, where strength is a function of actors’ network. However, we know little about the 
strategic options faced by actors who remain within the same domain for an extended time 
because, as domains evolve, the structure of opportunities clearly changes. Touching on a 
similar issue, the interplay between networks and field evolution, Powell et al. (2005: 113) 
note that because “analyses of fields and networks have been oddly disconnected,” we do 
not have yet a good understanding of the co-evolution of fields and the structures of 
opportunities and constraints in fields. The implication of this disconnect for theories of 
social capital is that we still do not have an answer to the question: how does the return on 
brokerage change as fields evolve?  
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In this paper, we aim to answer this question by investigating the relationship between field 
maturity and return on brokerage within the field of strategic management research. We 
build on prior research on the transition of strategic management research from an informal 
coalition of scholars to a discipline with a large membership and a significant institutional 
presence and recognition (Bowman, Singh and Thomas 2002; Hambrick and Chen 2008; 
Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington 2002). We develop hypotheses about the link between 
the structural holes around an author or team of authors, which is our measure of brokerage, 
and the citation impact of their research output, which is our measure of return on 
brokerage, contingent upon the maturity of the field.  
Our article is organized as follows. First, we examine the mechanisms that link structural 
holes to higher work recognition through citations. Second, we discuss how field maturity 
affects the link between brokerage and citation impact. We then analyze our data on the 
collaborative network of authors in the field of strategic management. Finally, we discuss 
the implications of our results for research on network brokerage and the study of field 
evolution and innovation. 
	
Theory	
 
The positive link between brokering across structural holes and performance is predicated 
by two related mechanisms: access to diverse information and timing (Burt 2005: 16). The 
first mechanism, access to diverse information, emphasizes brokers’ innovative potential 
due to their exposure to different pools of information. When direct contacts are 
interconnected, they often draw from similar information pools and, thereby, provide 
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redundant, self-reinforcing points of view. By contrast, unconnected direct contacts lead to 
different perspectives and pieces of information. Burt summarizes the argument: 
“brokerage across the structural holes between groups provides a vision of options 
otherwise unseen” (Burt 2004 p. 349). When these options translate into concrete proposals 
and work projects, they become “good ideas” that are likely to receive greater accolades 
from peers (Burt 2004). Further, structural holes provide not only the opportunity to 
generate new ideas but also a site to test their robustness. Competing or contradictory 
perspectives help authors to identify early on the weaknesses of a new argument and thus 
make improvements before submitting it for public scrutiny (Burt 2005; Mizruchi and 
Stearns 2001). 
The second mechanism, timing, emphasizes brokers’ timing advantage. From their position 
at the crossroads of information flows that originate in groups with diverse interests and 
expertise, brokers learn early about new ideas. Moreover, they are well positioned to 
understand the relevance of ideas circulating in the groups to which they are directly 
connected (Burt 1992; Burt 2005). In other words, brokers are not only more likely to 
generate good ideas but are also faster at generating these ideas. Time is an important 
aspect in the production of knowledge, as the valuation of a contribution is affected by the 
time at which it appears in the public domain. For example, the first publication of a novel 
argument tends, in general, to become a reference point and, consequently, receives more 
citations than subsequent papers, which are often seen as merely improvements of the 
initial argument. 
Taken together, the two mechanisms of access to diverse information and timing suggest 
that, because brokers are more likely both to produce novel ideas and to be faster than their 
6 
  
peers in delivering the idea, we should expect brokers’ ideas to be cited more frequently 
than those of other actors. However, being at the crossroads of information flows becomes 
an advantage only to the extent that brokers have a deep understanding of what is 
communicated by the parties with whom they interact, which is more likely when brokers 
have close, strong relations with their contacts. This condition is met in many scientific 
fields, where it is generally true that researchers who collaborated in the past with a focal 
scientist represent a source of tacit knowledge (McFadyen, Semadeni and Cannella 2009). 
Their shared past experience, which also implies that the ego has already been exposed to 
the area of specialization of alters, makes it easier for the ego to solicit the relevant 
information necessary for developing a novel idea. Prior collaboration facilitates open 
discussion and honest advice, thereby enhancing the robustness of new ideas. Finally, 
discussions with trusted contacts can provide relevant insights into aspects of research that 
are not necessarily content-related, but relate more to the presentation of an idea, the 
required time investment, or the venue that is more likely to welcome the new idea (see 
Zaheer and Soda 2009 for a related argument in television production). Therefore, we 
expect the information benefits of brokerage will hold for researchers in a scientific field.  
In knowledge field, research is produced both individually and in teams. For 
example, in strategic management, articles which are candidates for citation, can be single-
authored or have multiple authors. Building on previous research, we treat teams as unitary 
actors (Soda, Usai and Zaheer 2004; Zaheer and Soda 2009) that can also be brokers in an 
inter-team network. Figure 1 is a stylized graphical representation of our data. The nodes 
are papers written either by individual authors or teams of co-authors. For instance, papers 
P20 and P21 have two co-authors in common. Consequently, these two teams are 
connected. 
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 Treating teams as brokers in their own right is not unusual in network research. 
However, because the transposition of the brokerage argument from the individual level to 
the team level is not automatic, two aspects need to be considered. The first aspect relates 
to the plausibility that an individual who works on two teams represents a connection and 
that information passed through this connection is relevant to team outcome (see 
assumptions of composition and contagion in Zaheer and Soda (2009)). The second aspect 
concerns the plausibility of a causal linkage between inter-team network structure and the 
production and of new knowledge at the team level, independent from individual specific 
effects (Felin and Hesterly 2007; Zaheer and Soda 2009 ). Below we discuss these two 
aspects in detail in the context of research conducted by small teams of scholars in strategic 
management.  
First, in order for information to flow between two teams via an individual working 
on both teams and for this information to have an impact on team outcomes there needs to 
be frequent interaction, communication and collaboration among team members. This is 
likely to be the case for small teams of co-authors collaborating on papers. In this context 
tacit knowledge relevant to the production of research output is not only likely to flow 
between teams via common co-authors, but also to be discussed and analyzed by team 
members. Small team size and collaborative processes increase the likelihood that 
individual team members influence their teammates. Moreover, compared to typical work 
groups in which members only partially self-select, teams of co-authors agree to work 
together, an agreement that implies knowledge exchange and inter-personal influence.  
Second, regarding the causality argument, two conditions need to be considered. 
First, ties need to be relevant for the research outcome. To the extent that ties between two 
scholars carry information regarding research ideas, theoretical frameworks, 
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methodologies, experiences with various audiences and other tacit knowledge relevant to 
the research output, our data meets the first condition. Second, the way in which specific 
advantages that accrue to individuals who compose a team aggregate at the team level 
needs to be spelled out. Put differently, the critical issue is whether, for instance, by 
discussing brokerage at team level we ignore differences in brokerage at the individual 
level (Felin and Hesterly 2007; Klein, Dansereau and Hall 1994). While it is true that the 
capacity to act as a broker belongs to the individual, the aggregation of individuals with 
different brokerage profiles at the team level results in teams with distinct profiles: from 
high brokerage teams, whose members are primarily brokers, to teams whose members are 
drawn primarily from a close structure. To the extent that having individual brokers on a 
team increases the chance that the members will draw from different information pools in a 
timely manner and because co-authorship teams are small and interactive it is plausible that 
there are advantages at team level due to differences in informational advantages at the 
individual level.1 
If these assumptions hold, it then is possible to argue that the non-redundant tacit 
knowledge obtained by a small and cohesive team of researchers through ties with other 
teams is similar to the knowledge received by individual researchers who broker among 
unconnected parties, and that this knowledge is likely to contribute to creating scientific 
outputs that receive recognition from peers, often measured by citations (Hirsch 2005; 
Owen-Smith and Powell 2003; Singh and Fleming 2010; Wu 2012). Thus, we expect the 
information and timing advantages associated with structural holes to yield high citation 
impacts:  
                                                
1 We revisit the causality aspect in the Methods section, where we explain further how our choice of data 
modeling and control variables address the causality issue.  
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Hypothesis 1: The greater the number of structural holes in the ego-network of a researcher 
or research team, the greater the citation impact of the research output. 
Prior research has shown that returns to brokerage are higher when there is high egocentric 
uncertainty — that is, when uncertainty exists both about market opportunities and the way 
in which the ego can seize those opportunities) (Burt 2007; Hansen, Podolny and Pfeffer 
2001; Podolny 2001). This positive association between returns to brokerage and egocentric 
uncertainty stems from the very argument that explains returns to brokerage in the first 
place. Brokers are able to create novel solutions quickly when those around them do not 
constrain their search and use of diverse information. Moreover, novel solutions proposed 
by brokers are likely to be perceived as valuable to the extent that those around them are 
unsure about how to solve specific problems. This point is illustrated by Burt’s analysis of 
managers in numerous settings: managers enjoy higher returns to brokerage when the 
organization exerts little control over how they conduct their work (Burt 2010; Burt 1997). 
Similarly, Hansen et al. (2001) show that teams with brokering networks solve problems 
quicker when the problems are complex, new and therefore highly uncertain, as they are in 
explorative tasks. As soon as task predictability increases, such as for exploitative tasks, 
returns on brokerage diminish. At the limit, innovation becomes disruptive for people 
engaged in routine work and return on brokerage may become negative (Burt 2010). 
Finally, Podolny (2001) reaches a similar conclusion at the market level, showing that high 
egocentric uncertainty favors firms with networks rich in structural holes.  
High- and low-level egocentric uncertainty in different organizational and market settings 
is analogous to a comparison between earlier and later stages of field evolution. A field can 
be defined as collection of actors who “are attuned to and interact with one another on the 
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basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings” in terms of their common 
purpose, their relationship to other participants and “the rules governing legitimate action” 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012 p. 9). During the emerging stages of a field, the roles and 
rules of engagement are still to be written and the purpose of the field may be unclear 
(Fligstein 2001c; Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Powell and Sandholtz 2012; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1983). There is egocentric uncertainty regarding the goals to be pursued and how 
to achieve them. As the field matures, more stable roles and established norms regulate 
actions, thereby reducing egocentric uncertainty.  
In the case of an emerging academic field, debates may emerge about what constitutes its 
central research questions and where the boundaries lie in terms of more established fields 
(Hambrick and Chen 2008). The formal organizations that regulate the production of 
knowledge, such as professional associations and journal editorial boards, are still in the 
making. In the absence of well-established norms of control, actors are freer to generate 
new and original solutions and to take more entrepreneurial actions. Further, research 
projects in an emergent field are, almost by definition, exploratory, as the reference points 
are few and the goals may be unclear. In such an environment, rich in egocentric 
uncertainty and short on codified knowledge, diverse and timely tacit-knowledge acquired 
by brokers should yield high returns.  
By contrast, in a more mature field, the rules of the game have become more stable. As 
more actors enter into the field, competitive pressure increases, and success is defined 
primarily by the actions of the majority. Formal structures such as editorial boards, 
professional bodies and cohesive groups of scholars sort participants into distinct 
categories, discipline and reward for conformity with the norms of the field (Frickel and 
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Gross 2005; Hambrick and Chen 2008).  Further, an increasing number of textbooks 
contribute to the reduction in uncertainty regarding the specific problems studied by field 
participants (Kuhn [1962] 1970). Structuring tendencies have been noted by scholars 
interested in the social production of scientific knowledge in a variety of fields (Friedkin 
1998; Kuhn [1962] 1970; Mizruchi and Fein 1999). In his highly cited account of scientific 
production Kuhn ([1962] 1970) argues that as a scientific field matures its core paradigm 
offers the most legitimate way to frame and solve empirical puzzles and therefore it attracts 
the majority of researchers. These points are in line with Burt’s (1997) general brokerage 
argument that competition and legitimacy pressures contribute to reduce egocentric 
uncertainty and, therefore, have a negative effect on the returns to brokerage. In other 
words, some of the work produced by researchers with brokerage networks can end up 
being less valued and therefore less cited.  
 In addition to making changes that could affect the production of new knowledge and 
thereby reduce its perceived value, more mature fields present difficulties to those who 
consider using novel work. First, independent of their own valuation of the work, authors 
who aim to use work that represents a significant departure from established templates, may 
have anxiety about how their peers will perceive them. Second, incorporating novel ideas 
into an established framework demands cognitive and conceptual stretching, which is more 
difficult than the straightforward re-use of standard outputs that fall within established 
templates. Repeated exposure to homogeneous content may reduce the ability to deal with 
unconventional ideas. That is, in a mature field, the value of a brokerage position is 
diminished due a reduction in the level of egocentric uncertainty surrounding knowledge 
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production and the diminished likelihood that peers will embrace novel ideas. Formally, we 
hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2: The positive association between the number of structural holes and 
citation impact is stronger in an emergent field than in a mature field.  
	
Empirical	setting	
 
In this study, we consider the emergence of the strategic management research field. 
Toward the end of the 1970s, several scholars coined the Strategic Management label 
(Channon 1999). The Strategic Management Society (SMS) was founded in 1980, and it 
fostered the development of a community of scholars that expanded beyond the frontiers of 
smaller groups that already existed (Bowman, Singh and Thomas 2002; Hambrick and 
Chen 2008; Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington 2002). The Strategic Management Journal 
(SMJ) was the flagship publication of the new field (Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington 
2002). Strategy has since become a well-established research topic in major journals in the 
Management and Business category and at the Academy of Management, through its 
Business Policy and Strategy division (Hambrick and Chen 2008 p.38-40 for detailed 
description). Many business schools have departments specializing in the discipline. 
Finally, the community of researchers working under the Strategy label has established a 
distinctive research agenda that differentiates them from other fields (Hambrick and Chen 
2008; Nag, Hambrick and Chen 2007).  
The field of strategy management is an appropriate empirical setting in which to test the 
relationship between field maturity and brokerage for several reasons. First, the rich 
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evidence on the evolution of the field (discussed above) shows a gradual reduction in 
uncertainty regarding what strategic management is and what it means to do good research 
in strategic management. Second, strategic management researchers work both individually 
and in teams to advance knowledge in the field and, while interacting, they create a large 
collaborative network, comparable to those described in other settings (e.g. Powell et al. 
2005, Zaheer and Soda 2009). Third, citation impact is easy to measure and, in addition, 
represents a suitable indicator of the perceived value of a research output (Hirsch 2005; 
Owen-Smith and Powell 2003; Singh and Fleming 2010; Wu 2012).  
	
Data	
 
Outcomes of collaborative networks in a field can be accounted for in two ways. One 
approach is to first clarify the boundaries around a field and then to analyze the actors in 
their activity within these boundaries (e.g. Furrer, Thomas and Goussevskaia 2008; Moody 
2004). This approach is appropriate when analyzing a specific time period in the life of a 
field, but unsuitable when the origins of a field form part of the analysis, as we intend here. 
Strategic management as a research field did not appear as an isolated category, but through 
a process of differentiation and interactions with adjacent fields (Hambrick and Chen 
2008). In fact, its definition remained the object of debates 15 years after the founding of 
the Strategic Management Society (Porter 1996; Whittington 1993). Consequently, 
determining who belongs to the field and who is outside the field may not be 
straightforward, especially during the early stages of field development. Restricting our 
network to a fixed set of articles coded as contributions to strategic management would also 
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fail to capture collaborations with other disciplines, which was more intense in the early 
stages and has continued over time. Such collaborations contribute to study the effect of 
brokerage and should be included. 
A second approach, tailored to our specific research question, is to include in the network 
all collaborations that have affected knowledge production. Therefore, our strategy is to 
construct our data set without pre-defining a list of journals or the time at which the field 
was born. We ‘seeded’ our search with one journal that is considered to be central to the 
existing discipline — in this case, Strategic Management Journal (SMJ). However, 
critically, we do not restrict ourselves to the authorship relationships of articles published in 
this journal — instead, we set as the boundary to our network all journal articles that have 
ever been cited in this journal. This approach offers two advantages. First, the collaborative 
networks include co-authorships between scholars that may be in adjacent fields, but who, 
nonetheless, affect the production of knowledge in strategic management. Second, we do 
not set a time boundary on the formation of the field: because we allow all articles cited in 
the seed journal, we include co-authorship relationships that predate the founding of the 
seed journal. This inclusion is particularly significant, as we are interested in capturing the 
evolution of a nascent field; if we instead restricted the start date to the founding of a 
journal, doing so would create bias due to left censorship in our analysis. Our network is 
thus constructed using all authors in SMJ and in all references cited in the SMJ with 
publication year up to 2002.2 In total, our network comprises 20,903 articles and we test our 
hypotheses on our sample of 1192 SMJ articles. By considering only the flagship journal, 
we avoid issues related to weighting citation impact by the standing of a journal, especially 
considering that the journal prominence also co-evolves with the field.3 Further, SMJ 
15 
  
articles are institutionally recognized as contributing to strategy management by virtue of 
having being published in the main journal of the SMS. By contrast, establishing which 
articles were considered to be related to strategic management at the time of their 
publication in other outlets would require having information about the differentiated 
perception of actors across time.  
For all its advantages, this approach has an obvious limitation. Because we ‘seed’ in only 
one journal and test our hypotheses on articles published in this journal, unobserved 
variables may affect both inclusion in the sample and our dependent variable. Thus, a 
correlation between the error term and our explanatory variable may be induced if these 
unobserved variables affected the dependent variable, even if our explanatory variable was 
not endogenous (Sartori 2003). The instrumental variable approach we present in the 
method section addresses this issue. 
Methods	
 
To test our hypotheses, we used an instrumental variable approach as applied in Zaheer and 
Soda’s (2009) study of collaborative networks among television production teams. This 
approach enabled us to deal with (a) unobserved variables that are either correlate with our 
structural holes variable, both in the overall population of articles and in our sample or (b) 
unobserved variables that are uncorrelated with our structural holes variables in the overall 
sample variable but induce a correlation between the error term and the structural holes 
variable as a result of our sampling scheme (Sartori 2003). 
Our dependent variable is citation impact, measured by the number of citations received by 
an article. Citation impact measures the value and relevance of a research work as 
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perceived by peer scientists in other studies (Hirsch 2005; Owen-Smith and Powell 2003; 
Singh and Fleming 2010; Wu 2012). Because the distribution of the number of citations is 
skewed, we take the logarithm of the number of citations as our measure of citation 
impact.4  
Our main explanatory variable measures the presence of structural holes in the network 
around a team, which, in some cases, comprises only one individual. Ties between teams 
are weighted by the number of common co-authors. Thus, in Figure 1, the weight of the 
relationship between P21 and P20 is two because these teams have two authors in common. 
By contrast, the strength of the relationship between P21 and P22 is one because they share 
a single co-author. To measure the presence of structure holes, we use Burt’s measure of 
ego network efficiency (Burt 1992; Zaheer and Soda 2009), a ratio of the number of 
redundant ties to the total number of ties for a team i : 
1 * 1 iq jq
j qi
p m
C
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
−⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑  
where j and q index the teams to which team i is connected, piq is the proportional strength 
of the relationship that the focal team i has with team q, and mjq is the marginal strength of 
the relation between alter teams j and q, and Ci is a team’s total number of ties with other 
teams. More specifically, the strength of the relationship between two teams is given by the 
number of co-authors who jointly work on both teams, pi is the ratio of the strength of the 
relationship between i and q over the total weight of i relations, and mjq is the ratio of the 
strength of the relation between j and q to the maximum strength of any relation that j has 
with any other team in the ego network (see Burt 1992 p. 51).  
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We treated as endogenous our main explanatory variable: current structural holes as 
measured by network efficiency. We used instrumental variables that are predictors of our 
current structural holes measure but have no effect on citation impact. Past network 
structure has no effect on current team performance because it has been replaced by the 
current network structure (Zaheer and Soda 2009). However, the past network structure 
may have had an effect on the formation of current network structure. Figure 1 illustrates 
the difference between current network structure and past network structure. If we consider 
team P21 for year k, its current structural holes measure is calculated based on its ties to 
contemporary teams P20 and P22. P21 bridges the current structural hole between P22 and 
P20. By contrast, the past network structure for team P26 bridges the past structural hole 
between P18 and P19.  
---------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------- 
	
Construction	of	instrumental	variables	
 
Past network variables are used as instrumental variables to predict our endogenous 
variable: current structural holes. It is difficult to know for how long a past tie may be 
influential on current tie formation processes. The publication of a paper signals that a tie 
exists at least from the moment the co-authors started to work on the paper and is likely to 
remain active sometime after publication even if no new project is started. We used a five-
year moving window, taking as a point of reference the year for the current network.5 We 
then calculated past network measures around each team using the past network. Three 
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network variables predict current brokerage. First, past structural holes are measured by the 
ego network efficiency of each focal team in the past network structure. Second, past 
cohesion measures the intensity of relationship between team members in the past network. 
Past cohesion is measured by the ego network density Di of focal team i in the past 
network. 
( )* 1
i
i
i i
TD
C C
=
−
 
Ti is total the number of ties in the past ego network of focal team i, excluding ties to ego, 
and Ci the number of contacts that the focal team has in the past network. Finally, past 
degree centrality is also included as a predictor of i current network efficiency (structural 
holes).  
Second-stage	variables	
 
In the second stage, our dependent variable of interest is the log of the number of citations 
to the article produced by the co-authors. We used a number of control variables in the 
model. In an instrumental variable regression framework, these variables should 
automatically be included, both in the first stage and in the second stage of the regression. 
Field Maturity: Our operationalization of field maturity is the size of the largest connected 
component as defined Moody in his study on the structure of social science fields (Moody 
2004). A connected component is defined as a set of authors that can be reached through a 
chain of co-authorship links of arbitrary length. If one of these connected components is 
much larger than all the others, it is called the giant-component. The size of the largest 
component is calculated relative to a random network with the same density and the same 
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number of nodes. Many empirical networks are composed of distinct connected 
components that have no connection to one another. We calculate the relative size of the 
largest component for our network over time, and the results show a clear transition from a 
fractioned community of scholars to a more interconnected community in which both a 
large component dominates all other groups and all authors are connected directly or 
indirectly. Figure 2 illustrates these results. We see that in the early 1980s, the largest 
component was less than 5% of the expected value of a random network. The network is a 
series of small disconnected components. Toward the end of the 1980s, these components 
started to connect, and in the mid-1990s, the relative size of the network had grown to as 
much as 35% of the random expectation, and remained stable thereafter.  
To validate our measurements, we consulted studies on the emergence of strategic 
management as a fully-fledged academic field (Bowman, Singh and Thomas 2002; 
Hambrick and Chen 2008; Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington 2002). Their accounts are 
consistent with our measure. To check the robustness of our results, we ran similar 
regressions using a simple clock that counts the number of years since the foundation of the 
SMJ in 1980s. The results of these regressions are reported in Table A1 and A2 and similar 
to results reported in the main tables (Table 1 and Table 2). 
---------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------- 
Percentage of newcomers: Teams whose authors have already made contributions to the 
field of strategic management are at an advantage over teams that have never published 
articles relevant to the field. For each team, we calculated the percentage of authors who 
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had never published an article whose relevance to strategic management research was 
signaled by a citation in our seed journal. 
Team members’ reputation: Reputation is defined as the expected quality of an actor’s 
output based on past performance (Rhee 2009). The individual reputation of each team 
member accounts for heterogeneity among the population of authors, which is important on 
two accounts: (a) in the first stage of our two-stage Tobit regression, the reputation of 
individual authors may be a significant factor in the formation of structural holes around a 
team and (b) in the second stage of our regression, the presence of one or more high-
reputation authors may attract considerable attention independent of the quality of the 
research output (Darby, Liu and Zucker 1999; Zucker and Darby 1996). Thus, we calculate 
the reputation of the team as the sum of the reputation of its members and measure the 
reputation of each individual co-author as the number of citations to publications to which 
they have contributed.  
Team diversity: Team diversity may have an effect on research output. For example, 
Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) show that teams whose members are distant from one 
another in organizational tenure produce more scientific papers, patents, and reports. 
Zaheer and Soda (2009) also show that the content of information is important for 
television production teams. Consequently, to measure the net effect of our structural holes 
variable, we need to control for team diversity. We constructed a diversity index DIVk for 
each team (Blau 1977; Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). 
2
1
1
D
k kd
d
DIV P
=
= −∑  
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D is the number of disciplines in the Scopus journal-subject mapping. Pkd is the proportion 
of individuals from team k affiliated with discipline d. To affiliate an author to a discipline, 
we took the list of the journal articles cited within our seed journal and mapped the journal 
name to a discipline, using Scopus journal-subject mapping. We then mapped the author to 
the discipline with the maximum count.  
Institutional Prestige: The prestige of the institution to which a team member is affiliated 
accounts for some heterogeneity among the population of authors that is not measured by 
reputation. Prestige may also affect teams formation (e.g., homophily with respect to 
institutional prestige) and the attention paid to teams’ research output (e.g, more attention 
paid to articles written by co-authors from prestigious institutions). The position of an 
institution in a hierarchical social order can be defined as institutional prestige (Sine, Shane 
and Di Gregorio 2003). We constructed an independent institutional prestige variable using 
Business Week’s U.S. business schools’ rankings as proxy. Research on business school 
rankings shows that, over time, variance at the top of rankings is very low. The top-rated 
institutions are typically large institutions that also excel at research (Dichev 1999; Dichev 
2001; Dichev 2008; Morgeson and Nahrgang 2008). The low variance at the top of the 
ranking allowed us to use a fixed list. We took 1990’s top 10 rankings (Morgeson and 
Nahrgang 2008; Wedlin 2006) to construct a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if at 
least one co-author belongs to one of the following institutions: Chicago, Columbia, 
Dartmouth, Duke, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, MIT, Stanford, Pennsylvania 
(Wharton).6 
Number of authors: Some studies suggest that the increasing complexity, scale, and cost of 
research leads to collaboration and find a positive association between the number of co-
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authors and the impact of articles (Wuchty, Jones and Uzzi 2007). Thus, we include the 
number of authors as a control in our model. 
Past Collaborations: If a team of current co-authors also collaborated in the past, their 
accumulated experience may help them to work more efficiently on a new paper. We 
calculate the number of papers that the team members published together as a team in the 
past and include this measure as a control in our models. 
Cross-disciplinarity: Strategic management studies and management research, more 
generally, do not cite articles only from their own field (Agarwal and Hoetker 2007), 
especially during the early stages of strategic management research (Hambrick and Chen 
2008). We thus include cross-disciplinarity as a control variable for the following reason. 
Strategic management research that cites a large number of articles from another discipline, 
such as economics or sociology, may itself be cited more frequently because distinct 
audiences are interested in the output. Thus, we constructed four independent variables to 
measure the percentage of citations to Economics, Sociology, and Psychology, respectively, 
and a fourth category for other disciplines, using management as the baseline category.  
	
Results	
 
Descriptive	Statistics	
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. A relevant statistic is the mean number of 
authors per article, which, at 1.84, is small, indicating that authors have opportunities to 
share knowledge with all team members during the development and revision of a paper. In 
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most cases, having co-authors implies in-depth interactions in terms of interpreting the 
content of prior research, deciding on content that may hold valuable material for a new 
project, and defining the lines of enquiry. Thus, one team may gain a good understanding 
of the work of another team through a co-author common to both teams. Further, because 
of the small number of average authors per article, co-authors need to work together 
closely. Consequently, any information held by one author that relates to the work of any of 
the co-authors is likely to be shared and, thereby, influence the output. 
	
Test	of	hypotheses		
 
A Wald test of exogeneity shows that the structural holes variable should be treated as 
endogenous (χ2 = 16.04, p < 0.0001). Second, a Sargan test shows that the null hypothesis 
that the model is not over-identified cannot be rejected (χ2 = 0.13, not significant). Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics of the variables included in our models. 
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------- 
In Table 2, we present the results of the first-stage regression with structural holes as a 
dependent variable.7 All exogenous variables included in the second stage are entered in the 
first stage. In addition, we use three instrumental variables: past structural holes, past 
density, and past degree. First, we find that the greater the number of structural holes in the 
past network, the greater the number of structural holes spanned by a team in the current 
network, a result in line with prior research (Zaheer and Soda 2009). Second, we find a 
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weak positive effect of past density and a negative effect of past degree on current 
structural holes.  
---------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here 
---------------------- 
Table 3 presents the results of our second-stage regression. In this model, the dependent 
variable is citation impact, and the main explanatory variable is current structural holes. 
Model 1 is our baseline model. We find that having many new entrants in a team is 
negatively associated with citation impact. By contrast, reputation and institutional prestige 
are positively associated with citation impact. We also find that the number of authors is 
negatively associated with citation impact. In this first model, we find no positive 
association between the field maturity variable and citation impact. Finally, confirming 
Hypothesis 1, we find a positive association between structural holes and citation impact.  
In Model 2, we ran our full model, in which we introduced an interaction variable: current 
structural holes * field maturity. First, we observe that the main effect of current structural 
holes remains. Second, the interaction effect between current structural holes and field 
maturity is negative, thereby confirming Hypothesis 2, which states that the return on 
brokerage diminishes with field maturity. To give a better sense of the results, we 
calculated the marginal effect of the current structural holes variable at different levels of 
field maturity. The results are presented graphically in Figure 3, in which we plot the 
marginal effect of current structural holes for one standard deviation for all values of 
observed field maturity.  
---------------------- 
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Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------- 
First, current structural holes are seen to have a positive effect on citation impact at all 
levels of field maturity. Second, we observe that the effect of brokerage declines with field 
maturity. In the early stages of the development of the field, one standard deviation of the 
current structural holes variable increases the citation impact of an article, measured in 
terms of number of citations, by 16.21 citations. For the maximum value of our field 
maturity indicator, one standard deviation of the current structural holes variable increases 
the number of citations by only 2.36.  
 
Supplementary	Analyses	
 
The analyses presented so far support the argument that the impact of brokerage on citation 
is positive but diminishes with field maturity. Below we provide the results of 
supplementary analyses designed to check the robustness of our results and better describe 
the structural context in which these results appear.  
Robustness checks: We ran a number of tests to evaluate the robustness of our results. First, 
although we believe that the size of the largest component is a good indicator of the macro 
properties of the field in which actors are embedded, we ran regression using a simpler 
measure of the maturity of the field: time. We set a clock to zero in 1980, the year in which 
our seed journal, Strategic Management Journal, was founded. This clock variable 
increases by one unit per year. We report the results of the two-stage Tobit regression, 
which replaces our field maturity variable by this clock variable in Tables A1 and A2 
(Appendix A). We find that the results are similar to the results discussed above. Although 
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our data set stops 10 years after we measured the total number of citations, some papers 
may still receive frequent citations, thus biasing our measurement of citation impact for 
articles published toward the end of our observation period. Receiving citations after the 
10-year window is most likely for high-impact articles. We confirmed that our results still 
held after Winsorizing (Barnett and Lewis 1984) the dependent variable at the top two 
percentiles.  
Structure of collaboration: In the argument that led to Hypothesis 2, we proposed that the 
primary cause of decreasing returns on brokerage is the reduction in uncertainty regarding 
what constitute legitimate problems, methods and interpretations. The proposition that 
uncertainty decreases as the field matures also suggests that there might be changes in the 
structure of collaboration among scientists, such as increase cohesion in the field and 
consequently, changes in the structure of opportunities and constraints for brokers. We run 
a number of supplementary analyses to check for this type of changes.   
First, to understand cohesion we ran k-core decompositions in the network of 
authors derived from the bipartite author-paper network. A k-core is a maximal group of 
actors in which all actors are connected to at least k other actors (Butts 2014; Seidman 
1983). The intuition behind using k-cores to account for cohesion is that influence and 
consensus formation does not require direct contact between all members. Moreover, the 
higher the value of k, the more cohesive the structure and the harder it becomes for a single 
actor to join the group. We calculated the maximum k-core index and the size of the 
corresponding group for each year in our data. We find that the maximum k-core index 
increases from 4 to 7 between 1980 and 1992 and remains stable afterwards. Second, we 
find that once the maximum k-core index reaches its maximum value in 1992, the size of 
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the group of authors corresponding to the largest k-core index increases steadily between 
1992 and 2002 from less than 10 to values above 80. We also observe that the size of lower 
order k-cores also grows at high rates. The results are consistent with the argument that 
mature fields see a reduction in uncertainty regarding the legitimate problems, methods and 
interpretations and suggests that part of this reduction might be the result of increased 
cohesiveness in parts of the field.  
Second, we investigate brokers’ opportunity structure over time. If cohesive groups 
form, brokerage opportunities among their members decrease. Thus brokering teams may 
comprise more authors from outside these groups. To check this conjecture, we calculated 
the correlation between the sum of the eigenvector centrality of team members and the 
network efficiency (i.e structural holes) of the team. Eigenvector centrality is a recursive 
measure that takes into account the network structure around contacts of the focal actors 
(Bonacich 1987). Being connected to many well connected actors yield a high vector 
centrality, which is consistent with the idea of cohesive groups with highly central 
individuals connected to other central individuals. We find that the correlation between the 
sum of eigenvector centrality and network efficiency decreases from a peak of nearly 0.2 to 
slightly less than 0.05 in 2002. The finding that as the field matures brokering teams have 
fewer actors coming from a cohesive group is consistent with the arguments that late 
brokers find it more difficult to promote their ideas to the cohesive groups and that the 
members of the latter find it more difficult to embrace brokers’ ideas. 
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Discussion		
 
The presence of structural holes in the network of a focal actor is an important structural 
determinant of an actor’s success. Because actors with networks rich in structural holes 
create more novel ideas faster than their peers, their ideas are more likely to be rewarded. 
Our objective in this study was to contribute to social capital theory by showing how these 
rewards are contingent on macro-level properties of the field in which actors are embedded. 
We showed that as the field matures and as the level of egocentric uncertainty around 
brokers diminishes, the return on brokerage also diminishes. This finding has important 
implications for further research.  
Co-evolution of Micro-Behavior and Field Level Properties 
 
Our study contributes to the research that investigates the co-evolution of tie 
formation processes and field level/macro-network properties (Gulati and Gargulio, 1999; 
Powell et al., 2005). These studies show how field-level characteristics, including macro 
network characteristics, inform and guide future behavior. As Powell et al. (2005:1190) 
argue, the reason why, during boom years, biotechnology firms did not observe many of the 
well-known rules of social action, such as power attachment, homophily, and mimetism, 
but tended instead to follow a logic of forging alliances with diverse partners may be 
related to the fact that “as long as the technological trajectory continues to generate new 
discoveries and opportunities, expansion is possible.” Information about returns on 
brokerage in a field also represents information about opportunities. To the extent that 
brokerage generates high returns, actors are likely to continue engaging in brokerage and to 
expand the frontiers of knowledge. As the field matures, knowledge outputs are normalized 
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and returns to brokerage diminish. Alternative strategies could emerge and have a field 
level impact. Brokers who find that their ideas are too radical for the field may exit the field 
to form new disciplines or affiliate to neighboring fields. Yet others could reframe their 
ideas in terms more acceptable to the discipline.  
What strategy becomes predominant might vary with what is seen as the primary 
drive of field structuration. Field structuration could be driven primarily by a decreasing 
appetite for novelty or, by contrast, caused primarily by the difficulty to integrate novelty in 
the more clearly defined mature disciple. While both result in decreasing return to 
brokerage as fields mature, the mechanisms behind the two are different and their long term 
consequences are also different. A decreased appetite for novelty, due for example to an 
increasingly cohesive group that influences the field, would mean that the disciple has 
created a robust framework and will resist the introduction of new problems or suggest 
different interpretations of existing results. For example, to the extent that strategic 
management has as major goal understanding “the relative importance of different sources 
of performance heterogeneity” (Felin and Hesterley 2007) problems that cannot be easily 
framed as engaging with performance might be ignored. By contrast, integration difficulties 
may not be the result of major resistance, but rather reflect the effort required to link new 
problems and perspectives with a discipline’s existing commitments.  
Decrease appetite for novelty is likely to result in hindering innovation, perhaps 
encouraging brokers to leave the field, while integration difficulties may create the right 
framework for brokers to push the limits of the discipline, albeit at a slower pace than in the 
initial stages. Our data do not allow us to adjudicate between the two alternatives. Further 
analysis of the evolution of the structural properties of the collaborative network and an 
examination of the frequency with which new problems and interpretation are allowed in 
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the field is needed. One way to engage with the question is to look at the themes proposed 
in the calls for papers for special issues in main strategic management journals and special 
sections at top conferences. If these events are not so rare, if the authors who write for this 
events are not marginal in the collaboration network and if papers produced for these events 
become cited, this might be indicative of a field that is still accepting innovation.      
Another relevant aspect of the effect of macro-structural processes on returns on 
brokerage is the impact on network opportunities of sudden changes in a field, such as 
economic shocks or changes in regulation. In our model, the erosion of brokerage is gradual 
(Figure 3), and descriptive evidence (Bowman et al., 2002; Hambrick and Chen, 2008) 
suggests that the process of institutionalization in the strategic management field did not 
experience such a shock. However, in other settings, external shocks or actions by 
professional bodies that have a structuring role in the development of the field could force a 
dramatic new vision that either discourages or fosters brokerage.  
From a methodological standpoint, investigating these micro–macro linkages is not 
straightforward. The co-evolution of micro-processes and macro-structures and 
opportunities is a complex phenomenon in the sense that, as Schelling ([1978] 2006) 
demonstrated, the aggregate effect of an alteration of micro-behavior on macro-structure 
cannot be easily inferred from effect-size at the micro-level. As suggested by Hedström and 
others, the best suited models to investigate this type of problem may be agent-based 
simulations combined with empirical data (Hedström, 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; 
Phelps et al., 2012). A starting point to investigate how return on brokerage may affect tie 
formation strategies and eventually alter field structure may be extant models that 
investigate how small differences in tie-formation mechanisms among co-authors can result 
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in network structures that are dramatically different, such as being fragmented versus 
cohesive (Guimera et al., 2005).  
 
Macro Network Structures and Mobilization. Although the focus of our study was the 
moderating role of field maturity in the relationship between micro-network structures — 
that is, structural holes — and performance, field maturity may also be relevant to the 
relationship between macro-network structures and performance. We propose that field 
maturity may moderate the relationship between macro-network properties, such as 
network density, and performance outcomes due to the importance of mobilization 
processes during the early stages of field development. Extant studies usually invoke 
arguments of information benefits to investigate which macro-network structures may be 
most conducive to innovation. The evidence is mixed (Fleming et al., 2007; Guler and 
Nerkar, 2012; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). For example, Uzzi and Spiro (2005) find that an 
optimal point exists at which a level of clustering and short path length enable information 
to circulate in the network without compromising diversity. However, Fleming et al. (2007) 
do not observe such a relationship, but find evidence that short path length and the size of 
the largest connected component have a positive effect on innovative output. Finally, Guler 
and Nerkar (2012) find that network global cohesion, or network density, has a negative 
effect on innovation output.  
Networks are not, however, only pipes through which information is exchanged. They can 
also serve as mobilizing resources that are particularly significant in processes of field 
emergence (Frickel and Gross, 2005; Frickel and Moore, 2006; Hambrick and Chen, 2008). 
A dense network “provid[es] cohesion and enhanc[es] the carefully controlled 
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dissemination of an incipient field’s purpose, philosophy and agenda” (Hambrick and 
Chen, 2008 p. 37). The ability to convey an easily recognizable, consistent message and to 
coordinate action may help to attract recognition during a project’s early phases of 
development. Last, a cohesive network may also provide a vehicle for diffusing information 
regarding the costs and benefits of collective action (Hedström, 1994). Consequently, the 
relationship between innovation outcomes and macro-network properties may be 
moderated by the level of field maturity. During the early stages of development, a dense 
network may bring substantial mobilization benefits to its participants. The relevance of 
these mobilization benefits may then erode as the field matures, affecting the relationship 
between network density and performance outcomes. 
In conclusion, this study advances our understanding of the influence of field evolution on 
the relationship between structural holes and the success of innovative output. We develop 
a contingent perspective on the value of brokerage by empirically examining how field 
maturity affects the relationship between structural holes and citation impact. The decrease 
in the level of egocentric uncertainty associated with field maturation leads to a concurrent 
decrease of the return on structural holes. These results are not only relevant to scholars 
interested in the effect of ego-network structures on innovation processes but also call for 
further research on how the evolution of the opportunity-constraint structures in which 
actors are embedded can lead to catalytic adjustments of micro-behavior that induce further 
changes at the field level. Last, our findings suggest that research investigating the 
conduciveness of some macro network structures to innovation needs to also pay attention 
to processes such as mobilization. 
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